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Functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to identify the brain-based mechanisms
of uncertainty and certainty associatedwith answers tomultiple-choice questions involving
common misconceptions about electric circuits. Twenty-two scientiﬁcally novice partici-
pants (humanities and arts college students) were asked, in an fMRI study, whether or not
they thought the light bulbs in images presenting electric circuits were lighted up correctly,
and if they were certain or uncertain of their answers. When participants reported that
they were unsure of their responses, analyses revealed signiﬁcant activations in brain
areas typically involved in uncertainty (anterior cingulate cortex, anterior insula cortex,
and superior/dorsomedial frontal cortex) and in the left middle/superior temporal lobe.
Certainty was associated with large bilateral activations in the occipital and parietal regions
usually involved in visuospatial processing. Correct-and-certain answers were associated
with activations that suggest a stronger mobilization of visual attention resources when
compared to incorrect-and-certain answers. These ﬁndings provide insights into brain-
based mechanisms of uncertainty that are activated when common misconceptions,
identiﬁed as such by science education research literature, interfere in decision making
in a school-like task.We also discuss the implications of these results from an educational
perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
Answering scientiﬁc questions correctly has always been a consid-
erable challenge for students and an important – and sometimes
exclusive – indicator of academic success. One of the reasons why
it is such a challenge is that students sometimes have “miscon-
ceptions” about natural phenomena that interfere with learning
and, therefore, divert students from giving correct answers. Mis-
conceptions, as typically deﬁned in the science education research
tradition, are understood as “deeply rooted” ideas or common
erroneous beliefs about how nature works that are “not in har-
mony with the science views or are even in stark contrast to them”
(Duit and Treagust, 2003). For example, people often believe that
heavier balls fall more rapidly, even in the absence of air resis-
tance (Brown and Hammer, 2008), or they believe that a bulb can
be lighted up with a battery and a single wire (Sencar and Ery-
ilmaz, 2004; Pesman and Eryilmaz, 2010). These misconceptions
are problematic for science education because they are known
to be very difﬁcult to change. Contrary to the widespread belief
that students produce wrong answers because of their “lack of
knowledge,” the misconception paradigm is interested in the exis-
tence of a form of personal or socially shared knowledge that
does not conform to scientiﬁcally established knowledge and that
can explain the recurrence or persistence of some wrong answers
(Potvin, 2013).
School science, as well as educational researchers, often uses
multiple-choice (or true/false) questions to assess students’perfor-
mances or to diagnose misconceptions. Indeed, multiple-choice
questions often include wrong answers that intentionally con-
tain misconceptions in order to test students’ knowledge of the
material. In such contexts, the production of answers becomes
a matter of decision making. Indeed, decision making can be
deﬁned as the “process of making choices or reaching conclu-
sions”(Paulus,2005). However, such a process canbe very complex
and sometimes decisions must be made under varying degrees of
uncertainty.
Indeed, in previous research, we have been able to show that
subjects’ expression of certainty/uncertainty about their own con-
ceptions can have a very important effect on subsequent learning
in science (Potvin et al., 2010), perhaps even more than previous
knowledge. Since wrong answers might not always the product
of a lack of knowledge, it is important to study all the possible
combinations of certainty and accuracy, including the ones where
participants have conceptions and misconceptions on which they
can base their feelings of certainty. Indeed,many science education
papers have made it clear that the level of certainty/uncertainty
associated with the production of an answer is crucial to the qual-
iﬁcation of conceptions and misconceptions (Hasan et al., 1990;
Merenluoto and Lehtinen, 2002; Potgieter et al., 2010; Caleon and
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Subramanian, 2012). Thus, when wrong answers are nevertheless
associated with a high degree of certainty, they usually indicate the
presence of misconceptions.
Inspired by these research efforts, particularly Hasan et al.’s
(1990), we have proposed four categories of answers, based on
accuracy and expressed certainty/uncertainty (Potvin et al., 2010).
The ﬁrst category includes all correct-and-certain answers. We call
this category Legitimate Certainty (LC). It can be suggested that
in a task where the distractors are misconceptions, these answers
might indicate that subjects do not believe in the considered mis-
conceptions, or that they have been able to make more scientiﬁc
conceptions prevail. The second category includes all incorrect yet
nevertheless certain answers.We call this categoryOver-Estimation
(OE). According to Hasan et al. (1990), these answers might indi-
cate the presence of misconceptions more than answers for which
doubt is expressed. Indeed,whether ornot they are correct [Under-
estimation (UE)] or incorrect [Legitimate Doubt (LD)], answers
that are associated with a feeling of doubt can, according to Hasan,
be attributed to a lack of knowledge rather than to the presence of
a conception on which subjects base their answer, whether or not
it is scientiﬁcally accurate.
This particular categorization will allow us to formulate two
research questions that have the potential to help us better
understand, fromaneuroscientiﬁcpoint of view, the ordinary edu-
cational context of novice students assigned to a multiple-choice
task involving misconceptions in electricity. The ﬁrst question
will address the issue of differences that exist between certain and
uncertain answers. The results will allow us to establish interesting
links between studies that have been conductedwith other kinds of
tasks. The second question will address the issue of the difference
between cases where misconceptions most likely prevailed (OE)
and cases where they were overcome (LC).
DECISION MAKING UNDER CERTAINTY/UNCERTAINTY
Considered as a decision-making process, the educational event of
producing an answer to a multiple-choice question can be linked
to other research in the ﬁeld and can therefore be used as a starting
point. However, according to Volz et al. (2005), understanding the
mechanisms by which decisions are made is of very recent interest
in neurobiology, and“we are far away from providing a single gen-
eral theoryof humandecisionmaking [. . .]. But incorporating and
bringing together the ﬁndings from different disciplines concern-
ingdifferent aspects of decision-makingwill help inunderstanding
the big picture” (p. 403). Indeed, even if this “big picture” is not
clear yet, a considerable number of research efforts have stud-
ied the general brain-based mechanisms associated with decision
making under uncertainty using a variety of tasks.
In most studies, the experimenters control the level of uncer-
tainty by setting the level of ambiguity (Huettel et al., 2005;
Grinband et al., 2006; Simmons et al., 2008; Daniel et al., 2010).
In other studies, control of the level of uncertainty is modulated
by the probability of events to occur (Critchley et al., 2001; Volz
et al., 2003; Krain et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007; Preuschoff et al.,
2008; Schlosser et al., 2009; Hosseini et al., 2010; Sarinopoulos
et al., 2010; Stern et al., 2010).
However, since typical school science questions about concepts
are not ambiguous, and since their formulation usually excludes
uncertain probabilities of events to occur, we will concentrate on
studies interested in uncertainty levels that are determined by
internal lacks of knowledge. Volz et al. (2004, 2005), for exam-
ple, used two experiments to explore “variants of uncertainty.” In
one experiment, they used a task where subjects were informed
to varying degrees about the rules controlling the environment,
which created different levels of lack of knowledge and, therefore,
uncertainty. A parametric analysis revealed the activation of the
posterior fronto-median cortex (BA8) “as a common cortical sub-
strate of uncertain decisions”(p. 409). These results are interesting
to us because they address the issue of uncertainty induced by a
lack of knowledge, but they do not address the question of the
accuracy of predictions, which is rather important in educational
contexts.
In a functionalmagnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study (Har-
ris et al., 2008), subjects were asked if some statements (about
mathematics, geography, biography, and religion, among other
subjects) were true, false, or undecidable. The state of uncertainty,
when compared with “independent of context” states of belief and
disbelief (p. 143), was found to be associated with the anterior cin-
gulate and decrease the caudate signal. This result is interesting to
us because many of the questions were very similar to the school
question format, like “(2 + 6) + 8 = 16,” “Eagles are common
pets,” or “Senegal borders Guinea” (p. 142). The state of uncer-
tainty was associated with activation of the anterior cingulate as
well as the superior frontal gyrus.
Other studies have preferred to use memory recognition
tasks where subjects reported different levels of conﬁdence in
their recollections of previously learned information, such as
words or faces (Henson et al., 2000; Chua et al., 2006, 2009;
Kim and Cabeza, 2009; Hayes et al., 2011). In some instances,
high conﬁdence was associated with the anterior and posterior
cingulate, medial frontal, and medial temporal lobe (MTL) acti-
vations. However, it is highly likely that these results might
have been due to the particular nature of the task (face recog-
nition), and therefore it is not unusual that areas such as the
MTL, usually associated with memory functions, were more
activated.
These studies bear, to our knowledge, the closest resemblance to
school tasks that aim at assessing or developing conceptual knowl-
edge and can better enlighten the process of students resolving a
conceptual task. They will therefore serve as a basis for formu-
lating our certainty/uncertainty hypotheses. However, since they
have not tested certainty issues when misconceptions are involved,
a comparison with their results will be of interest. Therefore,
hypothesis No.1 (Uncertainty >Certainty) includes the activation
of posterior fronto-median cortex (BA8; Volz et al., 2004, 2005)
and the anterior cingulate as well as the superior frontal gyrus
(Harris et al., 2008). For Certainty > Uncertainty, it is more difﬁ-
cult to formulate hypotheses sincemany studies support amodality
speciﬁc view on conceptual representations (Kiefer and Pulver-
müller, 2012). Therefore results might be closely linked to the par-
ticular nature of the task used. Since the one we have used has not
been tested before, proposing clear hypotheses at this stage might
be a little reckless. Nevertheless,wewill propose speculative discus-
sion elements at the end of the article and comparisons with other
research.
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DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OVER-ESTIMATION AND LEGITIMATE
CERTAINTY
Recent research efforts have argued that for many kinds of sci-
entiﬁc learning, the executive function of inhibition might play a
very important role, as in conservation problems (Houdé, 2000;
Houdé et al., 2011), or even in “misconceptual” problems (Babai
and Amsterdamer, 2008; Babai et al., 2012; Shtulman andValcarel,
2012). In fMRI studies conducted by Dunbar et al. (2007),Masson
et al. (in press), Potvin (2013), and Nelson et al. (2007) with tasks
involving electricity, mechanics, and chemistry misconceptions,
it has been shown that experts activate regions that are gener-
ally associated with the function of inhibition. This suggests that
misconceptions are not eradicated, abandoned, or restructured
during the development of expertise (as is usually suggested in the
epistemology-based conceptual change tradition), but rather are
suppressed, allowing a prevalence of more scientiﬁc ideas (Potvin,
2013). The identiﬁed regions are the ventrolateral and dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortices, and sometimes the anterior cingulate.
In our analysis, we will hypothesize (hypothesis No.2) that con-
trasts between LC and OE (LC > OE) will show activations of
this kind. Thus it will be interesting to see if correct-and-certain
answers (LC) given by novices show activations that are similar
to correct answers given by experts. We will also check, using
a post hoc analysis, for interesting activations in other possible
contrasts.
CHOICE OF MISCONCEPTIONS TO INCLUDE IN THE TASK
In order to test our hypotheses, we have chosen to study the
pedagogical context of learning about electricity because mis-
conceptions about basic electric phenomena have been studied
thoroughly in the past and are therefore well known by the sci-
ence education community. We have thus developed a cognitive
task involving electric circuits that was based on educational
research on students’ misconceptions regarding this topic (e.g.,
Shipstone, 1988; Sencar and Eryilmaz, 2004; Periago and Bohi-
gas, 2005; Çepni and Keles¸, 2006; Pesman and Eryilmaz, 2010;
Potvin et al., 2010). The ﬁndings of this study will therefore pro-
vide insights into the brain-based mechanisms of uncertainty
related to common misconceptions in science (electricity). It is
our hope that this research will contribute to establishing a link
betweenneuroscientiﬁc considerations and– at least – one authen-
tic educational context, rather than establishing that link by using
tasks of greater psychometrical value, but of less “ecological”
(real life) value. If we succeed in establishing a few modest but
convincing connections between decision making research and
educational contexts, such as the assignment of scientiﬁc tasks
involving misconceptions, then it could also be possible to begin
considering some of the practical recommendations and prescrip-
tions that emerge from the abounding decision making ﬁeld as
potentially interesting for educational purposes (teaching and
learning).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-three right-handed participants took part in the study.
The images from 1 participant were excluded from the analysis
due to a technical problem with the response box. Therefore, the
images from 22 participants (11 males, between the ages of 18
and 20; M = 18.5; SD = 0.7) were used in the data analysis. Two
functional series (out of four) from 1 of these 22 participants were
also excluded from the analysis due to a trigger problem.
Since we needed “novice” participants who were less likely to
have prior knowledge of electricity, we recruited humanities and
arts college students who had never taken optional science courses
during their studies. Since individuals with anxiety disorders may
have different brain activations under uncertainty in the frontal
and limbic regions (Krain et al., 2008), volunteers who met the
criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders: Fourth Edition, Text Revised (DSM-IV-TR) regarding anxiety
disorders were identiﬁed by the ADIS IV-R test (Newman et al.,
2003) and excluded from the study (three women and six men
out of a total of 32 volunteers were excluded for this reason). The
remaining selected participants reported no abnormal neurologi-
cal history (depression, schizophrenia, anxiety disorder, etc.). They
received $20 for their participation and $20 as a transportation fee.
Written informed consent for all participants was obtained prior
to the experiment, and the study was approved by a local ethics
committee (Comité D’Éthique Mixte de la Recherche de l’Institut
Universitaire de Gériatrie de Montréal, Canada).
TASK
Based on a number of educational studies emphasizing the typ-
ical difﬁculties surrounding the understanding of simple electric
circuits (e.g., Shipstone, 1988; Periago and Bohigas, 2005; Çepni
and Keles¸, 2006; Potvin et al., 2010), we produced a bank of images
(Turmel et al., 2012) of series, parallel, and mixed electric circuits,
each composed of wires, a battery, and bulbs (one, two, or three
bulbs that could be either off or on at a lowor a high level of bright-
ness). The images consisted of photographs of real bulbs, wires,
and a battery that were modiﬁed using Adobe® Photoshop® Ele-
ments 8 to obtain correct and incorrect circuits (Figure 1). These
images were designed to obtain various levels of certainty and
uncertainty. Therefore, some of them were more intuitive and did
not involve any known misconceptions, whereas others were less
intuitive and involved common and well-known misconceptions.
To ensure that these images involved misconceptions, a committee
composed of two experienced teachers and two university pro-
fessors in science education (conceptual change specialists, who
have published in their ﬁeld) participated in their creation and
shortlisted the ones that were most likely to involve known mis-
conceptions. For example, in Figure 1, circuit A is “correct” and
can be considered as intuitive because it did not involve, accord-
ing to the committee, any frequent misconceptions. Circuit B is
“incorrect” and might involve the common misconception that
only one wire is enough to light up a bulb (Pesman and Eryilmaz,
2010). Circuit C is “correct,” but many students usually get this
question wrong, most likely because they believed the misconcep-
tion that the electric current is “consumed” in the circuit (Çepni
and Keles¸, 2006) and therefore they believed that the ﬁrst bulb
(in the direction of current) should have been brighter than the
second one. Circuit D is “incorrect” (because the lower extra wire
produces a short circuit), but most participants get this question
wrong, most likely because they believed the misconception that
extra wires cannot affect circuits (Sencar and Eryilmaz, 2004).
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FIGURE 1 | A few examples of the electric circuits depicted in the
experiment. Scientiﬁcally correct and incorrect circuits were presented and,
for each one, participants had to indicate, based on their own opinion,
whether or not the circuit was correct and express their level of
certainty/uncertainty about their answer. (A) Correct; (B) Incorrect;
(C) Correct; (D) Incorrect.
Prior to the experiment, the bank of images of electric cir-
cuits was tested with 243 participants (with characteristics such
as age, school level, and gender comparable to those of par-
ticipants who were later tested in the MRI machine) in order
to select a set of images that would optimize the chances of
obtaining, with an equivalent set of participants, a sufﬁcient
number of certain and uncertain responses, and also to control
some possibly confounding variables. Thus, the ﬁnal selection
of images for the cognitive task used in the fMRI optimized the
possibility of obtaining balanced numbers of scientiﬁcally cor-
rect/incorrect circuits, as well as an approximately equivalent
proportion of correct/incorrect answers and of certain/uncertain
answers.
The ﬁnal selection of stimuli used during the fMRI sessions
was composed of a set of 288 electric circuits divided into four
equivalent series of 72 randomly presented trials (Figure 2). Each
stimulus was presented for a maximum of 10000 ms (this pre-
sentation ended automatically when the participant pushed the
button to answer), followed by a ﬁxation period of 2500 ms (for
half of the stimuli) or 3000 ms (for the remaining half). For
each circuit, participants had to push one of the following four
buttons: (1) “The circuit is correct; I am certain.” (right index
ﬁnger); (2) “I think the circuit is correct, but I am uncertain.”
(right middle ﬁnger); (3) “The circuit is incorrect; I am certain.”
(left index ﬁnger); and (4) “I think the circuit is incorrect, but I
am uncertain.” (left middle ﬁnger). Depending on the accuracy
of the answers, these four possibilities allowed us to classify each
answer in one of the four possible response categories (OE,UE,LC,
and LD).
PROCEDURE
After they gave their written informed consent, participants were
taken to a simulation room with a computer on a desk and a
MRI SimulatorTM (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). Sitting at the
desktop computer, they had to read the instructions for the task
and do a practice task, which was composed of 20 electric circuits
similar to those used in the fMRI task. Afterward, the participants
repeated the practice task, but in the MRI simulator. Participants
were, at that time, explicitly informed not to move during the
practice task and imaging acquisition. Immediately afterward, the
task was administered in the real fMRI machine. Structural images
were also obtained at the end of the four functional image series.
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FIGURE 2 | Excerpts of the fMRI task, composed of 288 electric circuit images.
IMAGE ACQUISITION
Imaging was performed in a Siemens 3.0 Tesla MAGNETOM
Trio TIM using a 32-channel head coil. Functional images were
obtained with a gradient echo EPI sequence (TR = 2000 ms,
TE = 30 ms, FA = 90◦, matrix size = 64 × 64, voxel
size = 3 mm × 3 mm × 3 mm, number of slices = 33, slice
gap = 25%, interleaved, AC-PC line orientation, whole brain
scanned). The ﬁrst two images were automatically eliminated
by the system. Structural images were obtained with a MPRAGE
sequence (TR = 2300 ms, TI = 900 ms, TE = 2.98 ms, FA = 9◦,
matrix size = 256 × 256, voxel size = 1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm,
number of slices = 176, interleaved, sagittal orientation). Head
motion was minimized by cushions arranged around each par-
ticipant’s head. Stimuli were presented with E-Prime 2.0 software
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) via a mirror and a projection
system. Subjects’ responses were collected with the Fiber Optic
Button Response System (Series 1) from Psychology Software
Tools, Inc.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Data analysis was performed using SPM8 (Wellcome Depart-
ment of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). Each participant’s
functional data were motion-corrected (realignment with mean
image), spatially normalized (into the standard MNI space using
the segmentation method in SPM8), and smoothed (using a
Gaussian kernel of 8 mm FWHM). The general linear model
(GLM) was used for modeling the data. More precisely, trial-
related activity was modeled by convolving a vector of trial onsets
with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). The
six movement parameters were also included in the model as
regressors of no interest.
Three of the 22 subjects had one functional series with an
empty condition because they were always sure (or unsure) of
their answers for all the electric circuits in a series. These three
series were excluded from the analysis.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Responses to a total of 5976 electric circuits were analyzed. Twenty
of them (0.3%) remained unanswered by participants. Partic-
ipants reported to be certain of 64.7% of their answers and
uncertain of 35.0%. Behavioral task results (Table 1) show that the
average reaction timewas longer when participants reported being
uncertain of their answer (M = 3911ms; SD= 1730ms) compared
to when they were certain (M = 3091 ms; SD = 1730 ms). This
difference (820 ms) is statistically signiﬁcant [t(5954) = −18.06,
p < 0.001].
The stimuli for which participants claimed to be uncertain of
their answers were composed of a similar number of scientiﬁcally
correct and incorrect electric circuits (50.7 and 49.3%, respec-
tively), right and wrong answers (49.3 and 50.7%), and men’s and
women’s answers (42.6 and 57.4%). There was also a comparable
number of stimuli that were evaluated as being correct and incor-
rect by participants (45.2 and 54.8%), and there were as many
uncertain stimuli in the ﬁrst two series of the session as there were
in the last two (51.8 and 48.2%).
The stimuli for which participants claimed to be certain of their
answers were also composed of a similar number of correct and
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Table 1 | Overview of the behavioral task results.
Uncertainty Certainty
Mean reaction time 3911 ms 3091 ms
Standard deviation 1730 ms 1561 ms
Total number of stimuli 2091 3865
Number of stimuli by type of electric circuit
Scientiﬁcally correct circuit 1060 1750
Scientiﬁcally incorrect circuit 1031 2115
Number of stimuli by students’ answer
“The circuit is correct” 945 1881
“The circuit is incorrect” 1146 1984
Number of stimuli by value of the answer
Right answer 1030 2178
Wrong answer 1061 1687
Number of stimuli by gender
Men 891 1978
Women 1200 1887
Number of stimuli by series
Series 1 and 2 1084 1853
Series 3 and 4 1007 2012
Mean reaction time is signiﬁcantly longer when students are uncertain of their
answers compared to when they are certain, t(5954) = −18.06, p < 0.001.
incorrect electric circuits (45.3 and 54.7%, respectively), right and
wrong answers (56.4 and 43.6%), and men’s and women’s answers
(52.2 and 48.8%). Furthermore, there was a comparable number
of stimuli that were evaluated as being correct and incorrect by
participants (48.7 and 51.3%), and there were as many uncertain
stimuli in series 1 and 2 as there were in series 3 and 4 (47.9 and
52.1%).
These results enable us to assume that the obtained results can-
not be attributed to unbalanced quantities of particular types of
answers, as would be the case if we had a prevalence of the fol-
lowing types of answers: masculine (vs. feminine), associated with
scientiﬁcally correct circuits (vs. incorrect), answered as correct
(vs. answered as incorrect), right (vs. wrong), or chronologically
presented at the beginning of the task (vs. at the end of the task).
fMRI RESULTS
Research question No.1 (uncertainty vs. certainty)
For the Uncertainty > Certainty contrast, four brain areas were
signiﬁcantlymore activated (p< 0.0005, uncorrected,min. 20 vox-
els) when participants expressed uncertainty about their answers
compared towhen they expressed certainty (Table 2 andFigure 3).
Themost posterior activationwas located at the intersection of the
left middle/superior temporal gyrus (BA 21/22), while the most
anterior activation was located in the right superior frontal gyrus,
extending to the dorsomedial frontal cortex (BA 8/9). Two other
signiﬁcant activations were recorded. One was located at the inter-
section of the left anterir insula, superior temporal gyrus, and
inferior frontal gyrus (BA 13/38/47), while the other was located
in the right and left anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; BA 24/32).
No signiﬁcant activation was noted in the parietal and occipital
lobes.
For the Certainty > Uncertainty contrast, a large bilateral acti-
vation, beginning in the middle/inferior occipital gyrus and the
inferior temporal gyrus and ending in the angular gyrus and supe-
rior parietal lobule, was observed when the participants were
certain of their answers compared to when they were uncertain
(Table 2 and Figure 3). The activation in the left middle/inferior
occipital gyrus and inferior temporal gyrus survived to a threshold
of p < 0.05, FWE-corrected,min. 20 voxels. Other signiﬁcant acti-
vations were observed bilaterally at the intersection of the inferior
parietal lobule and the postcentral gyrus, and at the intersection
of the precentral gyrus and the insula. A part of the activation
at the intersection of the right precentral gyrus and the insula
also reached the right inferior/middle frontal gyrus. The L mid-
dle/inferior occipital gyrus/inferior temporal gyrus (BA 19/18/37)
activation in the Certainty > Uncertainty contrast survived to
a threshold of p < 0.05, corrected, min. 20 voxels (with MNI
coordinated of −45 −72 −3).
Research question No.2 (legitimate certainty vs. over-estimation)
For the LC > OE contrast, ﬁve brain areas were signiﬁcantly more
activated (p < 0.0005, uncorrected, min. 20 voxels) when par-
ticipants answered correctly and were certain of their answers
compared to when they were equally certain, but answered incor-
rectly [Table 3 and Figure 4 (images of the left part of the ﬁgure)].
These regions were the left and right intraparietal sulcus, the right
premotor cortex, the right fusiform gyrus and the right motor
cortex. This last activation was also recorded (this time on the left
part of the brain) in the OE > LC contrast [Figure 4 (image of the
right part of the ﬁgure)].
Other results
All contrasts related to Certainty > Uncertainty (LC > UE;
LC > LD; OE > UE; OE > LD) showed patterns of activation
that we also found in the general Certainty > Uncertainty contrast
(i.e., occipito-parietal activations). None of the other possible con-
trasts between the four response categories (UE > LD; LD > UE;
LD > OE; UE > LC) recorded signiﬁcant activation, except for
UE > LC. This particular contrast recorded a signiﬁcant activa-
tion of the anterior cingulate cortex. (MNI coordinates: k = 51;
x = −3, y = 30, z = 30; t =4,93; p < 0.0005, uncorrected, min. 20
voxels)
DISCUSSION
CERTAINTY AND UNCERTAINTY IN A MULTIPLE-CHOICE TASK
INVOLVING MISCONCEPTIONS
Uncertainty
Our hypothesis for Uncertainty > Certainty included the acti-
vation of the anterior cingulate, the superior frontal gyrus and
the posterior fronto-median cortex (BA8; with particular atten-
tion to medial temporal activations). It appears that much of this
hypothesis is conﬁrmed, since these regions were activated, with
few unexpected activations (see below). We therefore believe that
our results are in line with results obtained in other studies that
were looking for uncertainty caused by lacks of knowledge.
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Table 2 | Overview of the neuroimaging results (p < 0.0005, uncorrected, min. 20 voxels, MNI coordinates in mm, L = left, R = right, LR = left
and right).
Regions k x y z t
Uncertainty > Certainty
L middle/superior temporal gyrus (BA 21/22) 41 −63 −39 3 5.36
R superior frontal gyrus (BA 8/9) 34 9 54 45 5.32
LR anterior cingular cortex (BA 24/32) 59 −3 36 21 4.86
L inferior frontal gyrus/superior temporal gyrus and insula (BA 47/38/13) – into
the lateral sulcus
27 −36 15 −12 4.49
Certainty > Uncertainty
LR from middle/inferior occipital gyrus and inferior temporal gyrus (BA 19/18/37,
L peak) to angular gyrus (BA 39) and superior parietal lobule (BA 7/19)
1545 −45 −72 −3 8.40
LR inferior parietal lobule and postcentral gyrus (BA 40/2) 83 63 −24 42 6.31
R inferior/middle frontal gyrus (BA 44/8), insula (BA 13), and precentral gyrus
(BA 4/6)
40 42 −3 24 5.27
L insula (BA 13) and precentral gyrus (BA 4/6) 38 −33 0 18 5.19
L insula (BA 13) and precentral gyrus (BA 4/6) 22 −48 0 6 4.62
FIGURE 3 | Brain areas significantly more activated in the Uncertainty > Certainty and Certainty > Uncertainty contrasts (p < 0.0005, uncorrected,
min. 20 voxels).
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Table 3 | Overview of the neuroimaging results (p < 0.0005, uncorrected, min. 20 voxels, MNI coordinates in mm, L = left, R = right, LR = left
and right).
Regions k x y z t
Legitimate certainty > Over-estimation
L superior/inferior parietal lobule (L intraparietal sulcus; BA 19/7) 26 −27 −48 48 5.64
R premotor cortex (BA 6) 87 21 −9 45 5.51
R superior/inferior parietal lobule (R intraparietal sulcus; BA 19/7) 102 33 −51 63 5.50
R inferior temporal gyrus (fusiform gyrus; BA 37) 34 48 −48 −9 4.91
R precentral/postcentral gyrus (motor cortex; BA 4/3) 43 51 −21 51 4.65
Over-estimation > Legitimate certainty
L precentral/postcentral gyrus (motor cortex; BA 4/3) 72 −42 −18 57 5.78
FIGURE 4 | Brain areas significantly more activated in the LC > OE (A) and OE > LC (B) contrasts (p < 0.0005, uncorrected, min. 20 voxels).
Indeed, theACCwhichhas been reported in anumberof related
studies (Critchley et al., 2001; Krain et al., 2006; Harris et al., 2008;
Daniel et al., 2010; Stern et al., 2010) was activated. There are at
least two broad perspectives on the role of this region in decision
making. The ﬁrst focuses on the fact that theACC is often involved
in tasks in which detection of conﬂicts (often called error detection
or conﬂict monitoring) is necessary. These tasks include the Stroop
task (e.g., Bench et al., 1993; Bush et al., 1998), various versions
of the Flanker task (e.g., Botvinick et al., 1999), tasks related to
the go/no-go paradigm (e.g., Braver et al., 2001), and tasks where
prepotent responses have to be overcome (e.g., Nathaniel-James
et al., 1997). The second perspective associates the ACC with the
evaluation of the action outcomes. It was founded on a group of
studies showing that the ACC is engaged when negative outcomes
are expected, such as monetary loss in gambling tasks (Bush et al.,
2002), negative feedback (e.g., van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008), or
social rejection (Eisenberger et al., 2003). According to this per-
spective, it has been argued that the ACC guides decision making
by performing a cost-beneﬁt analysis that may be based on past
action outcomes. These two perspectives are not necessarily in
competition with each other. Indeed, Botvinick (2007) proposed
an integrative account of the role of the ACC. He argued that
detection of conﬂicts can contribute to decision making (1) by
sending signals announcing the necessity of better cognitive con-
trol in the prefrontal cortex, but also (2) by provoking a kind of
negative reinforcement leading one “to avoid tasks or strategies
that have given rise to it in the past” (p. 359). This second con-
tribution explains how the detection of conﬂict can be linked to
negative outcomes. However, in our task, there were no nega-
tive outcomes or feedback. Therefore, since participants reported
being uncertain about some of their answers, it is possible that
there experienced conﬂicts. These might have been caused by an
incompatibility between knowledge about electric circuits learned
in school and misconceptions that continued to drive decision
making. Another hypothesis would be that conﬂicts might have
been caused by competition between more than one conception,
or conﬂicts between different conceptions applying to different
parts of the circuits.
Also, in compliance with our hypothesis, the superior frontal
gyrus and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex were activated. The
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superior frontal gyrus has often been reported in other studies
about decision making under uncertainty (Henson et al., 2000;
Volz et al., 2004, 2005; Tobler et al., 2007; Harris et al., 2008; Daniel
et al., 2010; Hosseini et al., 2010; Stern et al., 2010). This region,
more speciﬁcally the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, is known to
be involved in working memory and response selection (Rowe
et al., 2000; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Curtis and D’Esposito, 2003;
Blumenfeld andRanganath, 2006).When our subjects were uncer-
tain of their answers, they might have been hesitating between
two competitive responses (“Is the circuit correct or incorrect?”)
and possibly between two levels of certainty (“Am I sure or not
of my answer?”). Mean reaction times might have been longer
for uncertain than for certain responses (3.911 ms compared to
3.091 ms) as a result of such hesitations. In a more pedagogical
interpretation, we suggest that participants might have been hes-
itating between different conceptions that coexist and compete
and that it took more time to answer because of the need to sup-
press some interfering conceptions (Shtulman andValcarel, 2012).
The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex has also been associated with
uncertainty in decision making in a number of studies (Grin-
band et al., 2006; Platt and Huettel, 2008; Zaretsky et al., 2009;
Daniel et al., 2010; Hosseini et al., 2010; Stern et al., 2010). The
role of this region in decision making is not completely under-
stood, but is perhaps related to uncertainty independent of the
kind of uncertainty involved in the task. In a series of experiments,
Volz et al. (2003, 2004, 2005) tried to ﬁnd differences in brain
activation between uncertainty caused by a lack of knowledge
and uncertainty caused by the manipulation of the probability of
events. In both situations, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex was
recruited.
Another region that is more activated under uncertainty is the
left superior temporal gyrus, extending to the middle temporal
gyrus. Contrary to the brain areas previously discussed (ACC,
insula, and superior/dorsomedial frontal cortex), the activation
of this region has been rarely reported in studies about decision
making under uncertainty, and when it has been, the results were
contradictory. For example, Stern et al. (2010) observed that the
left and right middle temporal gyrus regions are activated during
the execution of a decision made under uncertainty, and Sim-
mons et al. (2008) observed that the intolerance of uncertainty
is positively correlated with the activation of the right superior
temporal gyrus. However, other studies have presented oppo-
site results. For example, Schlosser et al. (2009) noted that the
right middle temporal gyrus is negatively correlated to uncer-
tainty, and Huettel et al. (2005) observed that the activation of
the left superior temporal gyrus and the right middle temporal
gyrus is independent of the level of uncertainty. These contradic-
tory studies point to the idea that the left middle and superior
temporal gyrus activations observed in our data are perhaps
not directly related to uncertainty. Indeed, since the left tem-
poral lobe is known to be involved in language processing and
semantic and declarative memory, it is possible that the uncer-
tainty trials require the activation of an inner language. Such
an inner language might need to be used by learners during
the resolution of complex problems that involve many elements
linked in complex ways, like in our electric circuits, especially the
most complex ones. It is also possible that the use of this inner
language might be an intermediate state of knowledge, before
automatization is achieved, and therefore should be encouraged
in the context of learning how to resolve complex problems in
class.
We also recorded activation of the insula (extending to the
inferior/middle frontal gyrus and the precentral gyrus). This area
has also been activated in a number of studies about decision
making under uncertainty (Volz et al., 2003, 2005; Huettel et al.,
2005; Grinband et al., 2006; Platt and Huettel, 2008; Preuschoff
et al., 2008; Simmons et al., 2008; Daniel et al., 2010; Hosseini
et al., 2010; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010; for a review, see Singer
et al., 2009), and is associated with aversive (Sarinopoulos et al.,
2010) emotional response (Bechara and Damasio, 2005), some-
times in risky situations (Platt and Huettel, 2008; Preuschoff
et al., 2008). But the insula is also, in some cases, associated
with cognitive functions, like differentiation (Kurth et al., 2010),
depending on its distinct sub-regions. Since its activation was
not necessarily excepted and because of its numerous possible
functions that were difﬁcult to relate to our task, we will pro-
pose a rather conservative interpretation: since, in our study,
the subjects did not receive any negative feedback, nor were
they subjected to aversive stimuli or risky gain/loss situations,
we suggest that being uncertain, even in the absence of incen-
tives or feedback (Stern et al., 2010), may cause an intrinsic
negative emotional arousal. These results tend to support the
idea that uncertainty, disequilibrium or cognitive dissonance
(Festinger, 1957) are uncomfortable states that could explain
avoidance, and, in the long run, loss of interest. However, since
the insula was also activated in the Certainty > Uncertainty
contrast, it is likely that it is essentially the properties of our
task that involved this region, possibly because of its complex-
ity (integration/differentiation of many elements of the electric
circuits).
Certainty
We did not formulate explicit hypotheses about the Cer-
tainty > Uncertainty contrast, since the studies we cited in the
previous section did not extensively discuss the brain-basedmech-
anisms related to certainty. There are still, however, a few studies
that focus on the neural correlates of certainty associated with
decision. For example, some researchers have studied the brain-
based mechanisms of conﬁdence in recognition memory (e.g.,
Chua et al., 2006, 2009; Kim and Cabeza, 2009; Hayes et al., 2011).
Their results reveal that the MTLs, especially the hippocampal
region which is known to be involved in memory, are more acti-
vated for high conﬁdence. In our study, we did not observe any
activation of this region probably because the electric circuit is
not a recognition memory task, or because the activation hap-
pened equally in both response categories. We however observed
signiﬁcant activations in the lateral intraparietal cortex. More pre-
cisely, we found bilateral extended activations in the posterior
region of the brain, beginning at the inferior occipital gyrus and
ending at the angular gyrus and the superior parietal lobule. These
regions are typically related to visuospatial processing. The ventral
activations are likely related to visual processing and the identiﬁ-
cation of many of the objects in the stimuli (e.g., identiﬁcation
of the battery, bulbs, and wires) and complex conﬁgurations, and
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the more dorsal activations are probably related to spatial pro-
cessing. This predominance of the visuospatial processing during
trials where participants reported to be sure of their responses
is probably caused by the fact that uncertain trials caused a
larger amount of cognitive processing and, indeed, the subjects
needed more time to answer uncertain trials than certain trials.
Another interpretation, however, would be that since the “cer-
tainty” response category can likely be associated with cases where
participants founded their answers on a strong enough conceptual
basis (regardless of whether this basis was scientiﬁc or not), it is
possible to suggest that conceptions about electric circuits could
be grounded in visuospatial functions. Indeed, Kiefer and Pul-
vermüller (2012) have recently suggested, based on an extensive
review of literature, that conceptual features “are stored in distinct
sensory and motor brain areas depending on speciﬁc sensory and
motor experiences during concept acquisition”(p. 805). For exam-
ple, they found in studies that hand-related concepts like “pick”
and mouth-related concepts like “lick” activate corresponding lat-
eral and ventral parts of the motor cortex, whereas foot-related
concepts like “kick” activate more dorsal parts (p. 812). Accord-
ing to such “embodiment theory” interpretations, the electricity
concepts, at least in the context of our task, could be the con-
sequence of our participants’ past experiences with real electric
circuit tasks that required visuospatial treatment. These experi-
ences might have been numerous enough to ultimately produce
feelings of certainty. We believe that the activation of the most
dorsal parts of the large posterior activation (involved in spa-
tial processing) supports this interpretation, especially keeping
in mind that in the “uncertain” response category, which is the
contrasting condition, subjects also had to treat visual images of
circuits.
It is true that our task presented images thatwere similar to real-
istic photographs of electric circuits and did not refer to abstract
representations of circuits, such as mere schemas with straight
lines, nor did it not use sentences to describe scientiﬁc phenom-
ena or conceptions. Indeed, we believe that if our stimuli had been
induced with words instead of images, by stating for example that
“one wire is sufﬁcient to light a bulb,” it would have been highly
likely that visuospatial regions might not have been recruited as
much. It does not appear unreasonable, however, to suggest that
scientiﬁc competency (at least with electric circuits)might be asso-
ciatedwith visuospatial treatment. Therefore, dealingwith real-life
tasks (like school lab experiments) and complex problems that
necessitate visual treatment could improve the ease with which
students learn about electrical concepts.
NOVICES OVERCOMING – OR FALLING INTO – THE TRAP OF
MISCONCEPTIONS
In accordance with previous research on the differences between
novices and experts in scientiﬁc tasks involving misconceptions
(see above Section “Difference Between Over-Estimation and
Legitimate Certainty”), our second hypothesis suggested that
contrasts between LC and OE (LC > OE) would show activa-
tions of the ACC and the dorsolateral and ventrolateral cortices.
This hypothesis could not be conﬁrmed. Typical inhibition
mechanisms did not show any signiﬁcant activation for correct-
and-certain answers compared to incorrect-and-certain ones. Thus
we cannot say that the brain activations of novices when they
give correct and certain answers are similar or close to the brain
activations of experts when they give correct answers. There-
fore, it is possible that the development of a minimal level of
expertise (unlike our participants, even though they sometimes
produced correct answers) is required to record inhibitive acti-
vations. We believe that further investigation into this matter is
required. Some recorded activations might be associated with the
use of left and right hands (precentral/postcentral gyrus (motor
cortex) [left for OE > LC and right for LC > OE]). Indeed, a post
hoc analysis showed that in the LC response category, answers were
expressed more often with the left hand (1,001 stimuli vs. 890), as
OE showed a majority of right-hand answers (858 vs. 641). The
right premotor cortex was also activated for LC > OE, most likely
indicating that answering with the left hand required more con-
trol (Halsband et al., 1993), possibly because our participants were
right-handed.
The activation of the left and right intraparietal sulcus that was
recorded is usually associated with number processing (Dehaene
et al., 2003; Houdé et al., 2011). We also recorded an activation of
the fusiform gyrus that is usually associated with the identiﬁcation
of objects (Puce et al., 1996; Tarkiainen et al., 2002). In our task,
these regions were activated when participants were able to avoid
falling into the trap of misconceptions. It is therefore possible that
better processing of the complexity of electric circuits (position-
ing and number of bulbs, wire, etc.) played an important role in
understanding – and performing with – simple electricity prob-
lems. Therefore, merely directing more visual attention to these
problems could explain the difference between success and failure.
CONCLUSION
From an educational perspective, we ﬁrst believe that presented
results are rather encouraging because they suggest that resolu-
tions of multiple-choice educational tasks could be understood
as decision-making processes. Second, since during our task we
never gave any negative feedback to the participants, we believe
that activations that occur during uncertainty can be associated
with an internal conceptual conﬂict between competing concep-
tions. It is also possible that the activation of the left temporal
lobe, and the corresponding suggestion that inner language was
used, could be an indication of a conﬂict that would require a
heavier dialectic process to be resolved. We believe that these
are interesting results because similar interpretations have been
proposed, but for differences between experts and novices (Dun-
bar et al., 2007; Masson et al., in press). It is therefore possible
to believe that these expert > novice contrasts have revealed
activations that are in fact attributable to typical uncertain > cer-
tain contrasts. However, this would either suggest that novices’
uncertainty implies the availability of more conceptions (than
in “certain” situations) to confront, or that experts are typically
more inclined to uncertainty than novices. A possible educational
interpretation of the presence of conﬂict in uncertain situations
might also bring support to pedagogical models that believe that
many conceptions about a single phenomenon can coexist and be
conﬂicted, instead of models that believe that only one concep-
tion can exist at a time for a given phenomena. Many conceptual
change models, for instance, postulate that learning consists of
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modifying or restructuring initial conceptions. Instead, it could
be hypothesized that conceptual change is often a modiﬁcation of
the relative statuses of some conceptions at the expenses of others,
until one of them prevails. We have also suggested that because of
the activation of the anterior insula, uncertainty appears to be a
rather uncomfortable state, and even if cognitive conﬂict is gen-
erally considered useful for learning (accommodation), it remains
unsettling.
For the “certainty” category of responses, we found large
posterior activations, usually associated with visual and spatial
processing. Our interpretation suggests that scientiﬁc conceptions
about electricity might be grounded in the visuospatial circuits
of the brain. Even if other means should not be discarded as
interesting ways to develop scientiﬁc conceptions, we hypothe-
size, that visuospatial training with real (or realistic) tasks (such
as laboratory tasks or working with realistic images), might lead
to more conﬁdence when tackling tasks like the one we used in
our study. We believe that this suggestion is quite in line with
Uttal et al.’s (2012) results which were obtained with an exten-
sive meta-analysis: “Spatial training programs therefore may play
a particularly important role in the education and enhancement
of spatial skills and mathematics and science more generally” (p.
19). This result might be the most robust we have presented in
this article, because the recorded large posterior activation within
the Certain > Uncertain contrast is the only one that survived a
corrected threshold.
Our second hypothesis was that we would ﬁnd typical inhi-
bition activations in the contrast between correct-and-certain
answers and incorrect-and-certain ones (LC > OE). In this setup,
we hypothesized that correct-and-certain answers would be typi-
cal of expert answers. However, we were not able to show typical
expert or inhibitive activations. Instead, most recorded activa-
tions could be interpreted as the use of left and right ﬁngers,
and possibly the mobilization of identiﬁcation and number pro-
cessing. Based on these results, we can hypothesize that correct
answers might require a more thorough examination of our elec-
trical circuits. Indeed, some were rather complex and might
have necessitated a greater number of veriﬁcations (identiﬁcation
and enumeration of all different parts) and therefore the mobi-
lization of visual attention resources. It can also be suggested
that in order to answer correctly to scientiﬁc questions, novices
recruited resources that differed from the ones experts would
recruit.
This research can be considered as an effort to link neuroscien-
tiﬁc and educational knowledge through the use of an authentic
educational context involving the resolution of a multiple-choice
task (considered as a decision-making process). We believe that
this effort has been fruitful because the recorded activations about
uncertainty/certainty were typical of decision-making processes
that involved uncertainty caused by “lacks of knowledge.” There-
fore we believe that many of the extended knowledge elements
about decision making might prove useful in the long run to bet-
ter understand school performance and failure. But we also believe
that much more work has to be done in order to better understand
the differences between the production of correct answers and
expertise, and also the origins and the function of uncertainty in
learning. In science, uncertainty can indeed be the driving force of
knowledge development, but in some cases, it can also be paralyz-
ing. Thus expert uncertainty might be at least somewhat different
from novice uncertainty.
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